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Right to an Attorney 
majorities with vigorous dissents. Considering the recent 
upswing of school violence and changes to the composi-
tion of the Court, it is unclear whether future Supreme 
Court decisions will strengthen or further erode the 
constitutional rights of students. 
SEE ALSO Colleges and Universities; Education and the 
Constitution; First Amendment; Fourteenth Amendment; 
Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975); Morse v. Frederick, 
551 U.S. _ (2007); Parental Rights; Speech in Public 
Schools; Tinker v. Des Moines School District, 393 U.S. 
503 (1969) 
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RIGHT TO AN ATTORNEY 
The Supreme Court has identified two distinct rights to 
an attorney that stem from the U.S. Constitution. One is 
rooted in the Fifth Amendment. The other is rooted in 
the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. The Fifth 
Amendment right to an attorney is the right that all 
arrestees have to counsel during a custodial interrogation. 
That right relates to the Fifth Amendment right against 
compelled self-incrimination. Counsel may help advise 
the arrestee regarding the implications of making state-
ments during the interrogation. Nonetheless, the arrestee 
may waive the right to counsel. However, in the absence 
of an intelligent and knowing waiver of the right to an 
attorney, statements gleaned from the arrestee in contra-
vention of the right to counsel are not admissible against 
the arrestee if the arrestee is later prosecuted. 
The Sixth Amendment right to counsel is the right 
to the assistance of counsel whenever a defendant in 
federal court faces criminal charges that may lead to in-
carceration. As written, the amendment appears merely 
to allow a defendant to retain counsel when facing 
federal criminal charges. However, the right has bee:;, 
interpreted to include a guarantee that an indigent d~· 
fendant will be provided appointed counsel whenevi 
requested, at no cost. The right to counsel in staf . 
criminal cases is very similar to the Sixth Amen dine~·,-. 
right, but flows directly from the Fourteenth Amend; 
ment' s due process clause. That clause prohibits state'l? 
from depriving persons of life, liberty, or property:. 
without due process of law. The denial of the right to the· 
assistance of counsel is a due process violation. Conse- .. 
quently, whenever a state wishes to incarcerate a defen-.. ~. 
dant, it must allow the defendant to retain counsel or . 
must provide appointed counsel at no cost. The Sixth 
and Fourteenth Amendment rights to the assistance 0f ... 
counsel arise as soon as the government begins adversaiy 
judicial proceedings against a defendant. ,.,,,_; 
Defendants may waive the right to the assistance of"(' 
counsel and assert their right to self-representation) 
though such action is discouraged. The violation of the 
Sixth or Fourteenth Amendment right to counsel usually ·:o 
yields a new trial in which the right to counsel is properly. 
observed. However, in some situations, a violation will 
merely yield the exclusion of evidence gathered in con-
travention of the right or a determination that the viola-
tion was harmless error. For the remainder of this 
reference to the Sixth Amendment right to counsel 
refer to both the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights 
to counsel unless a contrary intent is clearly indicated. 
HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE SIXTH 
AMENDMENT RIGHT TO AN ATTORNEY 
The Sixth Amendment of the Constitution of the United 
States states, "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall 
enjoy the right to ... have the Assistance of Counsel for his 
defence." The amendment affirmatively disavowed 
English common law practice that limited the right to 
counsel in criminal trials. Under English common law, civil 
litigants and criminal defendants charged with 
demeanors were allowed to retain counsel to reJJtesen« 
them at trial. However, defendants charged with felonies 
treason were not per1!1itted to have counsel represent tht:m'fi,;.c; 
at trial. Rather, they were allowed to engage counsel to 
them about specific points of law that might be relevant 
the case. Though England retained vestiges of this 
until 1836, nearly all of the American colonies affir~ 
matively rejected the English common law rule and 
guaranteed the right to retain counsel, at least for the most 
serious crimes, in their state or colonial constitutions 
the U.S. Constitution was ratified. However, in the early 
years of the United States, the right to counsel was in 
substance a guarantee that a defendant could retain counsel 
if the defendant could pay for counsel, not the right to have 
counsel appointed free of charge. 
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RIGHT TO AN ATTORNEY IN FEDERAL 
CRIMINAL CASES 
[n Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938), the Supreme 
Court determined that indigent defendants in federal 
courts have the right to have counsel appointed for them 
free of charge. In that case, the defendant-a U.S. Ma-
rine on leave-was charged with passing counterfeit 
rwenry-dollar bills. The defendant had counsel during his 
preliminary hearing, but could not secure counsel for 
trial. The defendant, acting as his own counsel, was 
convicted and sentenced .to four and one-half years in 
prison. The Court indicated that the average layperson 
was ill equipped to defend himself or herself in court, 
even in a seemingly simple case. Consequently, it deter-
mined that "the Sixth Amendment withholds from fed-
eral courts, in all criminal proceedings, the power and 
authority to deprive an accused of his life or liberty unless 
has or waives the assistance of counsel." With that 
statement, the Supreme Court recognized the right to 
counsel. In the absence of counsel, and an 
intelligent and competent waiver of the right to counsel) a 
court has no jurisdiction to proceed with a 
criminal case. In noting that the defendant's lack of 
counsel affects the federal court's jurisdiction, the Su-
','preme Court suggested that the need for counsel is as 
much about the circumstances under which the federal 
government may exercise its judicial power as it is about 
<:/',!';;providing help to defendants to protect their freedom. 
';)i;X'~\:'.:(~,iven that the prevalence of federal crime has expanded 
t::t:{;:J~,igniftcantly in the decades since Johnson was decided, the 
S/;,j,:i_{,ight to counsel in federal court arises much more fre-
2~;quent!y now than it did then. 
'.¢';fgRIGHT TO AN ATTORNEY IN STATE 
;CRIMINAL CASES 
/l'.{i'.!he right to appointed counsel in state court is grounded 
,\~rectly in the due process protections of the Fourteenth 
;~endment. The seeds of the right to appointed counsel 
:::-:::;;:,#t~ state court criminal trials were planted before the right 
',,' o;!iJ9, appointed counsel in federal court criminal trials was 
'nflrmed in Johnson. However, the right to appointed 
unsel in state court criminal proceedings took a more 
·cuitous route to be recognized than the right to 
10inted counsel in federal criminal proceedings. The 
t had to be recognized as part of Fourteenth 
Fndment due process, rather than through the Sixth 
'~~ndment because the Sixth Amendment is not directly 
~µcable to the states. 
:'fhe Fourteenth Amendment provides that no state 
I "d · 
' epnve any person of life, liberty or property, 
.out due process of law." Due process rights are those 
·e sufficiently fundainental that they are "implicit in 
'llcept of ordered liberty," in the words of the Court 
lko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937). Until the 
Right to an Atto1·ney 
right to counsel was established as fundamental, whether a 
defendant's due process rights had been violated depended 
on the circumstances in the subject case underlying the 
denial of appointed counsel. A number of years elapsed 
before the Supreme Court migrated from the position that 
the refusal to appoint counsel in a state criminal trial 
violates the due process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment under some circumstances, to the position 
that the Fourteenth Amendment generally guarantees the 
right to appointed counsel whenever the state seeks to 
incarcerate a defendant. 
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932), argnably was 
the beginning of the process that eventually yielded the 
general right to appointed counsel in state criminal trials. 
Powell involved the Scottsboro Boys, a group of young 
African-American men and boys who were accused of 
raping two white women on a train in Alabama in 1931. 
Though they had access to unofficial counsel prior to 
trial, counsel was not officially appointed for the defen-
dants until the morning of their one-day trials, a mere 
two weeks after the alleged assault occurred. The Su-
preme Court concluded that Ozie Powell and the other 
Scottsboro Boys had not been afforded the right to 
counsel because they had not been afforded the ability to 
secure counsel on their own. More importantly, the 
Court concluded that had the defendants been unable to 
secure counsel, the failure to appoint counsel for them 
would have been a denial of due process under the 
Fourteenth Amendment, given their circumstances. Be-
fore directly addressing the right to counsel, the Court 
discussed the situation surrounding the trial, indicating 
that the heinous nature of the crime, the hostility of the 
public, the need to use the military to protect the 
defendants, and the age of the defendants were all rele-
vant factors in the due process analysis. Only after this 
explanation did the Court note that "in a capital case 
where the defendant is unable to employ counsel" and 
where the defendant cannot adequately defend himself or 
herself "because of ignorance, feeblemindedness, illiter-
acy, or the like," the court must appoint counsel in a 
manner and at a time that allows the counsel to provide 
"effective aid in the preparation and trial of the case." 
Consequently, the Court's decision left open the possi-
bility that counsel did not have to be appointed for a 
poor defendai1t in many circumstances. 
In Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942), the Court 
made clear that in the general run of state criminal cases, 
the Constitution did not require that counsel be 
appointed for indigent defendants. In Betts, the defendant 
was chai·ged with robbery. His request for appointed 
counsel was refused, as the practice in Carroll County, 
Maryland, was to appoint counsel only for rape or murder 
defendants. The defendant, acting as his own counsel, was 
convicted and sentenced to eight years in prison. Citing 
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Powell, the Betts Court noted that whether the denial of 
appointed counsel violated due process was a case-by-case 
determination. In this case, the Court found the defen-
dant capable of taking care of his case on his own. Not 
only did the Court find no general right to appointed 
counsel in state criminal cases, it suggCsted that the 
multitude of ways in which the states then decided when 
and whether to appoint counsel suggested that the right to 
appointed counsel was not a fundamental right that trig-
gered a due process violation when denied. Nonetheless, 
the Court made cleat in Chandler v. Fretag, 348 U.S. 3 
(1954), that state court defendants undoubtedly had the 
right to retain counsel at their own cost. 
The debate regarding appointed counsel was altered 
forever in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), a 
case in which the Court asked the litigants bluntly 
whether the Court should overrule Betts. In Gideon, the 
defendant was charged with a felony, burglary with the 
intent to commit a misdemeanor. The state claimed 
Gideon had broken into a pool hall and stolen alcohol and 
spare change from a jukebox. Gideon requested that 
counsel be appointed for him because he was unable to 
afford counsel. However, he was told that Florida pro-
vided counsel only to those who were charged with a 
capital offense. Gideon represented himself and was 
convicted. He was sentenced to five years in prison-the 
maximum penalty for his crime. 
The Gideon Court overruled Betts. The Court 
forcefully rejected the notion that a layperson can ade-
quately serve as counsel in his or her own case noting, 
"reason and reflection require us to recognize that in our 
adversary system of criminal justice, any person hauled 
into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be 
assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him." 
Noting that "lawyers in criminal courts are necessities, not 
luxuries," the Court raised the specter of the innocent 
layperson being convicted merely because of a lack of 
familiarity with a judicial system that an attorney has been 
trained to navigate with ease. With that, the Court found 
a general right to appointed counsel for indigent defen-
dants. Nevertheless, defendants rich and poor retain the 
right to waive counsel and represent themselves. 
With the issue of the scope of the right to appointed 
counsel settled, the Court has, since Gideon, continued to 
determine the types of cases in which a defendant must 
have or need not have the option of an attorney. 1~he 
Court has focused on whether the defendant's liberty is in 
jeopardy. In In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967), the Court 
extended the right to appointed counsel to juveniles when 
the juvenile may be committed to at1 institution and have 
his or her freedom limited as a result. The Court does not 
focus on the type of charge involved. Consquently, in 
Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972), the Court 
extended the right to appointed counsel to those cases 
where any prison term is imposed, whether the crime is 
considered a petty offense or otherwise. In Scott v. Illinois 
440 U.S. 367 (1979), the Court limited the right t~ 
counsel, ruling that the right to counsel had not been 
violated in a case where the defendant was not provided 
counsel, but also was not sentenced to incarceration 
Recently, the Court resolving a lingering issue regardin~ 
the scope of the right to counsel in Alabama v. Shelton 
535 U.S. 654 (2002). In that case the defendant had bee~ 
convicted of assault and sentenced to thirty days in jail. 
However, the trial court suspended the sentence and 
placed the defendant on two years probation. The Su-
preme Court ruled that the defendant should have been 
offered the assistance of counsel, noting that counsel 
should have been available in any case in which a sus-
pended sentence could lead to "the actual deprivation of a 
person's liberty." 
Even before the recognition of a general right to 
appointed counsel, federal and state governments realized 
that poor defendants needed appointed counsel in some 
situations. However, in the wake of Gideon and its 
progeny, the need for appointed counsel increased sig-
nificantly. The need helped create the opportunity for the 
structured governmental provision of appointed counsel 
through government public defenders charged with pro-
viding appointed counsel for indigent defendants. Though 
some public defender's offices predate Gideon, many state 
and federal public defender programs ate the result of 
Gideon's focus on the right to counsel. The public de-
fendant structure of appointed counsel ensures that indi-
gent defendants are appointed counsel who are reasonably 
experienced and able to well represent the defendants. 
Though public defenders are available in many places and 
circumstances, courts continue to appoint Legal Aid So~ 
ciety attorneys and other private counsel to serve as 
appointed counsel when public defenders are not available 
to serve. 
WHEN THE RIGHT TO AN ATTORNEY 
ATTACHES 
The Fifth Amendment right to an attorney attaches when 
a suspect is placed in custody. On atrest, the suspect is 
informed of rights, pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 
U.S. 436 (1966), including the right to the presence ofan 
attorney. The suspect may waive that right. Additionally, 
the suspect may invoke the right to any attorney at 
time during the custodial interrogation or any sulJsequent 
custodial interrogations. 
Though the Sixth Amendment right to counsel 
most important during trial, it attaches well before trial.-
& the Court noted in Powell, "the duty [to 
counsel] is not discharged by an assignment as such 
or under such circumstances as to preclude the giving 
effective aid in the preparation and trial of the case." The 
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right to counsel attaches when the suspect becomes a 
defendant as a prosecution begins and continues 
throughout the duration of the prosecution. However, the 
Court reiterated most recently in Texas v. Cobb, 532 U.S. 
!62 (2001), that the right to counsel is specific to what-
ever offense is charged and does not apply to offenses that 
have not been charged. 
In Cobb, the right to counsel attached to the burglary 
with which the defendant was charged, but not to the 
murder of two occupants of the house the defendant 
burglarized. How the Sixth Amendment right to counsel 
attaches can lead to an interesting overlapping of the Fifth 
and Sixth Amendment-based rights to counsel. A defen-
dant who has been charged with one crime (Crime A) has 
a Sixth Atnendment right to counsel with respect to 
Crime A during the duration of the prosecution of Crime 
A. However, if the defendant is being investigated with 
respect to a different crime (Crime B), the defendant has 
no Sixth Amendment right to counsel with respect to 
Criine B until the government begins a prosecution of 
Crime B. Consequently, the defendant can be interro-
gated with respect to Crime B subject to the Fifth 
Amendment right to the presence of counsel during a 
custodial interrogation at the same time the defendant 
cannot be questioned with respect to Crime A without 
counsel. 
Though the defendant retains the Sixth Amendment 
to counsel throughout the prosecution, the presence 
is only necessary during critical pretrial stages of 
prosecution and the trial itself. The Court has sug-
that whether a stage is critical depends on whether 
defendant faces a skilled adversary and needs counsel 
to help protect his or her interests. Many of those stages 
'fill be filfmal court hearings. However, as pretrial pro-
'.:~esses have become more prevalent in criminal cases, the 
'import of the right to counsel has also grown. For ex-
::ample, the need to have counsel has expanded to some 
·oformal critical stages, such as evidence gathering in-
'qlving the defendant that may not have been completed 
the somewhat distant past. In focusing on the adver-
ial nature of a stage in determining whether it is critical 
not, the Court has rejected the notion arguably in1plicit 
,,,Powell that counsel should be present at any stage of the 
f:~secution where counsel's presence would help aid the 
ndant at trial. 
::,:_ The right to counsel must have been provided or 
;:ived if the government intends to prosecute a suspect or 
'lldant. However, it is somewhat unclear what obli-
'il the government has to allow a defendant to retain 
f;hsel or to appoint counsel if the government does not 
~nd to prosecute the defendant in any conventional 
This issue is of particular import with respect to 
'Cted terrorists. I"'hough the Court in Hamdi v. 
id, 542 U.S. 507 (2004), indicated that people held 
Right to an Atto1•ney 
by the United States 1nust be provided the opportunity to 
contest their detention before a neutral decision maker 
and must be provided counsel in the process, it is unclear 
what form the opportunity to contest will take or how the 
right to counsel will be shaped to allow it to comply with 
the exigencies of the situation the federal government 
claims exists. 
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF AND 
VIOLATIONS OF THE RIGHT TO AN ATTORNEY 
In McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970), the 
Court decided that the right to counsel subsumes the 
right to the effective assistance of counsel. Ineffectiveness 
may stem either from the government's interference with 
the right to counsel or from the incompetence of counsel. 
In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), the 
Court provided the standards for the ineffective assistance 
of counsel. If counsel's representation is shown to have 
been deficient and the deficient representation deprived 
the defendant of a fair trial, the defendant is treated as if 
he or she was essentially without counsel. A violation of 
the Fifth Amendment right to counsel-questioning 
without counsel and without waiver-leads to the ex-
clusion of the uncounseled statements. What occurs in 
the wake of a violation of the Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel depends on the nature of the violation. For ex-
ample, the denial of the right to choose the counsel of 
one's choice will lead to the reversal of a conviction. In 
contrast, the denial of the right to counsel in the colltext 
of gathering evidence may merely yield the exclusion of 
the evidence. Yet other violations may be subject to 
harmless error analysis, whid1 considers whether a viola-
tion may have affected the outcome of the trial. No 
possible effect on the trial's outcome yields no penalty for 
the violation of the right. Harmless error analysis should 
be distinguished from the requirement that a defendant 
show prejudice in the ineffective assistance of counsel 
area. Ineffective assistance of counsel stems from the 
defendant's right to a fair trial. Consequently, prejudice is 
necessaiy to prove that the right to a fair trial has been 
violated before any discussion of the penalty for the vi-
olation occurs. 
THE RIGHT TO AN ATTORNEY AND APPEALS 
The constitutional right to counsel extends to a 
defendant's first appeal of right, but does not generally 
extend to discretiona1y appeals. {See Halbett v. Michi-
gan, 545 U.S. 605 [2005]; Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 
U.S. 551 [I987].) Not surprisingly, the right to counsel 
does not extend to state or federal habeas cases, in-
cluding death penalty cases. (See Murray v. Giarratano, 
492 U.S. I [1989]; Finley; Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 
600 [1974].) Of course, many jurisdictions provide 
counsel to such defendants by statute. This entire area 
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is subject to continued debate, particularly given the 
number of death row inmates who have been exoner-
ated in recent years. However, the Supreme Court has 
not changed its decisions regarding the scope of the 
right to counsel. 
IMPACT OF THE RIGHT TO AN ATTORNEY 
The impact of the recognition of Fifth and Sixth 
Amendment rights to counsel cannot be overstated. Of 
course, it is the need to inform the suspect or defendant 
of the right to counsel that really created value for the 
Fifth Amendment right to counsel. The need to tell a 
suspect that he or she may enjoy the advice of counsel 
before speaking to police officers and investigators helps 
convince the Court that confessions are voluntary and 
fair, rather than coerced or involuntary. Interestingly, 
informing suspects of their rights, and requiring a 
knowing and intelligent waiver, has not stopped suspects 
from confessing to crimes. The Sixth Amendment right 
to counsel helps guarantee that when an indigent defen-
dant is convicted, it will not be because the defendant had 
no one to help him or her navigate the system. Similarly, 
it helps ensure that innocent poor defendants are not 
being convicted merely because they are poor and unable 
to afford counsel. In that way, the right to counsel is as 
much about protecting the integrity of the criminal jus-
tice system as it is about protecting the indigent defen-
dant from harm. 
However, one curiosity remains with respect to the 
waiver of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. The 
evolution of the right to counsel indicates a change in the 
conception of trials and the legal process in general. A 
trial is not simply an occasion on which the defendant is 
supposed to tell his or her side of the story and be pro-
tected from legal jeopardy by counsel if wealthy enough 
to afford counsel. Rather, the trial is viewed as the process 
through which a government seeks to impose the power 
of the criminal justice system on one of its citizens or 
subjects. Consequently, fairness dictates that the govern-
ment guarantee that defendants can adequately defend 
themselves, when necessaiy with the assistance of 
appointed counsel, before the government can exact 
punishment for a crime. The need for the government to 
mal(e sure that defendants are protected exists uneasily 
alongside allowing defendants to represent themselves, 
given the Court's admonition that laypeople have no 
business representing themselves even in fairly simple 
criminal matters. 
SEE ALSO Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 
(2000); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); 
Hamdi v. Rumsfa!d, 542 U.S. 507 (2004); In re Gault, 
387 U.S. 1 (1967); Lewis, Anthony; Miranda Warnings; 
Sixth Amendment 
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RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS 
The Second Amendment to the U.S. Constitution reads: 
"A well-regulated Militia, being necessary to the security 
of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear 
Arms shall not be infringed." Derived in part from a 
provision in the 1689 English Bill of Rights, which 
guaranteed the rights of Protestants to possess arms, an 
explicit protection was suggested by a number of states 
following the ratification of the U.S. Constitution, and 
was included in the twelve amendments submitted by 
James Madison (1751-1836) to the First Congress and to 
the states for ratification. 
Debates over the meaning of the Second Amend-
ment began in earnest in the 1930s when the first 
federal gun-control laws were passed; those debates in-
tensified in the late 1960s, continuing into the mid-
1990s as federal gun-control laws expanded. At the same 
time, what had been the prevailing consensus-that gun-
control laws raised no serious constitutional questions-
fragmented, with many respected constitutional law 
experts conceding, sometimes reluctantly, that the Sec-
ond Amendment did offer some protection for private 
gun ownership. 
Contemporaneously, cracks appeared in the judicial 
consensus, formerly dismissive of the notion that the 
Second Amendment protected any individual right. In 
2007 a petition for certiorari was filed asking the U.S. 
Supreme Court to rule on the constitutionality of the 
District of Columbia's total ban on handgun possession, 
which was struck down by the D.C. Court of Appeals. 
The Supreme Court agreed, in November of 2007, to 
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